BOYS MARKETS-NOW IS ARBITRATION A KINGPIN

OF NATIONAL LABOR POLICY?
INTRODUCTION

The capability of federal courts to deal effectively with suits
brought under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act1
for violation of arbitration and no-strike clauses of collective bargaining agreements has been seriously hampered for many years by
this statute's conflict with the anti-injunction provisions of the NorrisLaGuardia Act. 2 Although there were encouraging signs that the Supreme Court would forge an accommodation between the two statute
provisions,8 these hopes were dashed when it decided Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson. 4 In that case, the Court held that the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act prevented a federal
district court from enjoining a strike which violated a no-strike
promise contained in a labor contract, even though that agreement
also contained provisions, enforceable under Section 301, for binding
arbitration of the grievance dispute which caused the strike.
The decision, rather than expanding the case law previously
1 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964), provides in part:
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to
the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
[Hereinafter, this statute will be referred to as Section 301.]
2 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1964), provides in part:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out
of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested
in such dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from doing, whether singly or
in concert, any of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of
employment;
(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, any labor
dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any other method
not involving fraud or violence;
(f) Assembling'peaceably to act or to organize to act in promotion of their
interests in a labor dispute;
(i) Advising, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing without fraud or
violence the acts heretofore specified, regardless of any such undertaking or
promise as is described in section 103 of this title.
3 See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); Brotherhood of
R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I.R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
4 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
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developed by the Court around Section 301, 5 introduced elements of

confusion, uncertainty, and ultimately gamesmanship into an otherwise consistent area of labor law. One commentator likened the decision to a snake who resolutely attempted to swallow a frog for its
dinner; no matter how hard the snake swallowed, the frog kept jumping out.6 This colorful analogy correctly anticipated the difficulties
which would arise from the application of Sinclair in subsequent
years. On the one hand, the Court had declared that Congress intended arbitration to be the primary means for the peaceful resolution
of labor disputes. 7 However, Sinclair deprived the federal courts of
one of their most effective means of promulgating that policy, and
instead largely cast the burden upon state courts to force recalcitrant
parties to abide by the terms of their collective bargaining agreement
through the use of varying state injunctive remedies where they
existed. 8 Furthermore, the Court in Sinclair seemed unwilling to
reconcile Norris-LaGuardia with Section 301; whereas, in prior decisions the Court had appeared amenable to an accommodation between the two statutes. 9
Problems soon began to develop as employers, seeking injunctive
relief against illegal strikes, probed state and federal courts alike for
ways to get around Sinclair.Just as earnestly, union lawyers attempted
to fashion effective defenses to such tactics, primarily through the use
of the federal removal statute, 10 an action ultimately approved by the
5 Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); Charles Dowd Box Co.
v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962); Steelworkers Trilogy, 363 U.S. 593 (1960), 363 U.S. 574
(1960), 363 U.S. 564 (1960); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
6 Aaron, Strikes In Breach of Collective Agreements: Some Unanswered Questions,
63 COLUM. L. REv. 1027, 1034 (1963).
7 United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960);
and United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
8 In some cases, such remedies did not exist because of the existence of so-called
"little Norris-LaGuardia acts" which also barred injunctive relief in circumstances such
as those in the Sinclair case. In other cases, however, state courts granted injunctive
relief despite the existence of such statutes. For a thorough compilation of cases and
statutes, see Bartosic, Injunctions and Section 301: The Patchwork of Avco and Philadelphia Marine on the Fabric of National Labor Policy, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 980, 1001-03,
nn. 135-39 (1969).
9 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); Brotherhood of
R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I.R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
10 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964), provides in part:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have
original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to
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Court in Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 1AM. 11 The combined
force of Sinclair and Avco ultimately eliminated the injunction as a
means of halting illegal strikes in either federal or state courts and
created an imbalance of remedies that the Court could not long
ignore. Indeed, the frog had not only jumped out again, but this time
it threatened to get clean away.
On June 1, 1970, the Court in a landmark decision, Boys Markets,
Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770,12 acknowledged that the doctrine of Sinclairmust finally be reversed:
It is precisely because Sinclair stands as a significant departure
from our otherwise consistent emphasis upon the congressional
policy to promote the peaceful settlement of labor disputes through
arbitration and our efforts to accommodate and harmonize this
policy with those underlying the anti-injunction provisions of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act that we believe Sinclair should be reconsidered. Furthermore, in light of developments subsequent to
Sinclair, in particular our decision in Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge
735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968), it has become clear that the Sinclair
decision does not further but rather frustrates realization of an
important goal of our national labor policy. 13
With that, Mr. Justice Brennan, who had been the author of a
memorable dissent in Sinclair, and who had in that opinion largely
foreseen the problem areas which did eventually develop, proceeded
to establish the accommodation between Section 301 and Norris-LaGuardia which he believed should have been made eight years before.1 4 Stated simply, Boys Markets holds that a federal district court
may enjoin a strike which breaches a no-strike clause in a collective
bargaining agreement despite the anti-injunction provisions of NorrisLaGuardia, where the grievance over which the strike was called is
15
subject to final and binding arbitration under that agreement.
However, before proceeding to analyze and weigh the overall impact
of Boys Markets upon national labor law vis-A-vis arbitration and
injunctions, it would be well to recount more fully how the law in
this area has developed.
the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the
place where such action is pending.
11 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
12 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
13

Id. at 241.

14

370 U.S. 195, 215-16 (1962) (dissenting opinion).

15 398 U.S. at 253.
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BEFORE

Sinclair

Section 301 was passed by Congress as part of the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) of 1947.16 Its purpose was
to make the federal courts available for suits involving violations of
collective bargaining agreements in addition to remedies already
available through state courts. Prior to this statute, employers had
run into considerable difficulty in trying to sue unions for breaches
of contracts in state courts because in many cases procedural roadblocks (usually regarding service of process or execution of judgments)
had made unions virtually impervious to suit. On the other hand,
unions experienced no difficulty in bringing actions against employers. Section 301 was designed to dispell this obstacle" 7 as well as
to better equalize the legal remedies available to management and labor and to enhance the enforceability of collective bargaining agreements through methods other than self-help (strikes, lockouts, etc.).
What was not covered expressly in Section 301 was: (1) whether
or not the issuance of an injunction as a remedy under Section 301
was precluded by the anti-injunction provisions of Norris-LaGuardia;
and (2) whether or not Section 301 was strictly a procedural device, or
whether it represented as well an intent by Congress to forge a substantive body of law via the federal court system.
The first question appeared to be indirectly answered by
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana R.R.,
Co. 8 This case, involving the Railway Labor Act,19 was brought about
when the union decided to strike the carrier over a series of grievances.
RLA procedures, however, required submission of the dispute to the
National Railroad Adjustment Board for final and binding arbitration on the request of either party. 20 The issue presented was whether
the strike, which violated the statutory duty to arbitrate under the
RLA, was nonetheless protected from a federal court injunction by
Section 4 of Norris-LaGuardia. The lower court thought not,21 and
the Supreme Court agreed unanimously. The Court recognized that
16 29 U.S.C. §§ 141 et seq. (1964).
17 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1964), provides in pertinent part:
Any such labor organization may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf
of the employees whom it represents in the courts of the United States ....
18 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
19 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63, 181-88 (1964).

20 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (i) (1964); and 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (m) (1964), as amended,
Pub. L. 89-456, §§ 1, 2, 80 Stat. 208, 209 (1966).
21 229 F.2d 926 (7th Cir. 1956).
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an accommodation of the two statutes was necessary,2 2 and the reconciliation made was direct and decisive. The Court determined that
the situation in Chicago River was dominated by the statutory duty
to arbitrate, and that this obligation overrode the anti-injunction
policies of Norris-LaGuardia, even though taken literally, Section 4
would proscribe the issuance of a federal court injunction to bar
continuance of the strike.2 3 The Court was obviously influenced by
the fact that a "reasonable alternative" to a grievance-oriented strike
existed in the form of arbitration. This alternative represented an
important federal labor policy which should not be frustrated by an
anti-injunction statute which was passed for entirely different reasons.

24

This spirit of accommodation was soon extended to Section 30,1
in Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 25 which involved a suit brought by a union for specific performance of an
arbitration clause. The injunction issue presented was whether or
not Section 7 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act 26 prevented a federal court

from granting injunctive relief to compel arbitration of a labor dispute
under a collective bargaining agreement.
The Court noted that the abuses at which Norris-LaGuardia was
aimed were contained in Section 4 and that the refusal to arbitrate
353 U.S. at 40.
Id. at 41.
24 Id. at 40. It is generally agreed that the Norris-LaGuardia Act was passed in order
to put an end to the widespread use of the court injunction by management as a means
of discouraging union organizing and collective bargaining activities.
25 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
26 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1964), provides in part:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue a temporary
or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute,
as defined in this chapter, except after hearing the testimony of witnesses in
open court (with opportunity for cross-examination) in support of the allegations
of a complaint made under oath, and testimony in opposition thereto, if offered,
and except after findings of fact by the court to the effect(a) That unlawful acts have been threatened and will be committed unless
restrained, or have been committed and will be continued unless restrained, but
no injunction or temporary restraining order shall be issued on account of any
threat or unlawful act excepting against the person or persons, association, or
organization making the threat or committing the unlawful act or actually authorizing or ratifying the same after actual knowledge thereof;
(b) That substantial and irreparable injury to complainant's property will
follow;
(c) That as to each item of relief granted greater injury will be inflicted upon
complainant by the denial of relief than will be inflicted upon defendants by the
granting of relief;
(d) That complainant has no adequate remedy at law . . .
22
23
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was not among them37 Furthermore, the Court viewed Section 8 of
Norris-LaGuardia 28 as encouraging arbitration inasmuch as it denied
injunctive relief to anyone who failed to make "every reasonable
effort" to settle disputes through negotiation, mediation, or "voluntary
arbitration." Consequently, it concluded that federal courts were not
barred by Section 7 of Norris-LaGuardia from compelling an employer
to arbitrate a labor dispute under Section 30 1:
The congressional policy in favor of the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate grievance disputes being clear, there is no reason
to submit them to the requirements of § 7 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act.29

Although this decision was in favor of the union, the accommodation reached by the Court between Norris-LaGuardia and Section 301
in this case gave employers substantial reason to believe that they too
would receive similar consideration if they petitioned for injunctive
relief to compel the union to settle a grievance dispute through arbitration rather than through a work stoppage.
Lincoln Mills also resolved that Section 301 was a substantive
as well as a procedural statute and that the courts had been given
authority by Congress to formulate the principles by which the policy
of peaceful resolution of industrial disputes would be enforced:
Plainly the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the
quid pro quo for an agreement not to strike. Viewed in this light,
the legislation does more than confer jurisdiction in the federal
courts over labor organizations. It expresses a federal policy that
federal courts should enforce these agreements on behalf of or
against labor organizations 3 and
that industrial peace can be best
0
obtained only in that way.
The Court further concluded "that the substantive law to apply in
suits under § 301(a) is federal law, which the courts must fashion from
the policy of our national labor laws," 3' 1 and also that federal law as
interpreted by federal courts would stand superior to state law where
27 353 U.S. at 458.
28 29 U.S.C. § 108 provides:
No restraining order or injunctive relief shall be granted to any complainant
who has failed to comply with any obligation imposed by law which is involved
in the labor dispute in question, or who has failed to make every reasonable
effort to settle such dispute either by negotiation or with the aid of any available
governmental machinery of mediation or voluntary arbitration.
29 353 U.S. at 458-59.
30 Id. at 455.
31 Id. at 456.
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the two differed.3 2 Thus, the message which the Court appeared to
convey to both management and labor through Lincoln Mills was:
(1) that arbitration would be the process upon which the courts would
primarily rely to resolve most labor disputes arising during the term
of a given labor agreement; (2) that the contractual duty to arbitrate
would be specifically enforced by the courts through injunction where
necessary; and (3) that the injunction so issued would preempt any
state or federal anti-injunction statutes which might be applicable to
the circumstances of the case.
The decisions which followed Lincoln Mills consistently upheld
and expanded upon its basic premises. The Steelworkers Trilogy3
established the framework within which the courts would operate in
reviewing suits concerning the arbitration process. Courts were directed to limit their adjudication to the sole question of arbitrability
of the grievance and to leave the merits of the grievance and related
contract interpretation to the arbitrator.3 4 On the question of arbitrability, the Court stated that where the contract contained a broadly
worded arbitration clause without more, then all issues arising under
it were to be deemed arbitrable unless specifically excluded by the
parties. 35 Finally, the Court declared that they would not tamper with
the findings of an arbitrator under any circumstances unless it were
shown that the arbitrator in making his award had exceeded the juris36
diction given to him by the collective bargaining agreement.
On the question of state v. federal jurisdiction over Section 301
actions, the Court held in Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney3 7 that
Congress did not intend through Section 301 to displace state court
jurisdiction with that of federal courts. Rather, the statute was designed merely to provide the parties with an additional forum in
which to resolve their differences.3 8 Consequently, either party could,
if it chose, validly bring a Section 301 type action in a state court.
82 Id. at 457. The Court also stated, however, that:

[S]tate law, if compatible with the purpose of § 301, may be resorted to in
order to find the rule that will. best effectuate the federal policy.
Id.
33 United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960);
and United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
34 United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 567-68 (1960).
35 United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. at 584 (1960).
36 United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 599
(1960).
87 368 US. 502 (1962).
38 Id. at 508-09.
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Lincoln Mills, however, required that federal labor policy be adhered
to whether the action be brought under state or federal statute.3 9
This latter point was reinforced shortly thereafter by Teamsters
Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co. 40 In this case, the Court affirmed a state
court's award of damages to an employer for a union's breach of a
no-strike clause. However, the Court stated that while federal jurisdiction did not preempt state court jurisdiction to try Section 301
type cases, substantive federal labor law must be applied to the facts
of each case no matter whether the forum be state or federal.4 1 The
rationale behind this holding was that Congress desired, through
Section 301, to establish a uniform body of labor law, and this end
could be achieved only if federal law prevailed over "inconsistent
local rules." 42 The obvious alternative was a lack of consistency between state and federal courts in deciding Section 301 type cases. The
result would be that parties to an action would expend more effort
attempting to have their case heard in the court more likely to favor
their position rather than in resolving the substantive issues.
Lucas Flour also held that the court would imply a no-strike
pledge by a union where a contract contained arbitration provisions
to settle grievance disputes, even though an express no-strike clause
was not contained in the agreement. To hold otherwise, said the
Court,
would obviously do violence to accepted principles of traditional
contract law. Even more in point, a contrary view would be completely at odds with the basic policy of national labor legislation
to promote the arbitral process as a substitute for economic war48
fare.
THE DISLOCATION OF

Sinclair

With the holding in Lucas Flour, the Court now seemed to
have provided a basic foundation of substantive federal labor law
around which to apply Section 301. It had established its authority
U.S. at 457.
369 U.S. 95 (1962).

39 353
40
41
42

Id. at 102.
Id. at 104.

43 Id. at 105. In so holding, the Court affirmed a doctrine espoused by five different
federal circuits. See Local 25, Teamsters Union v. W.L. Mead, Inc., 230 F.2d 576, 58384 (lst Cir. 1956); United Construction Workers v. Haislip Baking Co., 223 F.2d 872, 876-77
(4th Cir. 1955); NLRB v. Dorsey Trailers, Inc., 179 F.2d 589, 592 (5th Cir. 1950); Lewis v.
Benedict Coal Corp., 259 F.2d 346, 351 (6th Cir. 1958); and NLRB v. Sunset Minerals, Inc.,
211 F.2d 224, 226 (9th Cir. 1954).
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to create such law; it had determined that such law must be respected
by state and federal courts alike on a uniform basis; it had crowned
arbitration as a "kingpin '"44 of its federal labor policy; and it appeared
willing to reconcile Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act with the Norris-LaGuardia Act in order to enforce arbitration
clauses whether the complaining party be management or labor. Consequently, when the Court was petitioned in Sinclair Refining Co. v.
A tkinson 45 by an employer to enjoin a strike which violated a bargaining agreement, management attorneys were understandably
shocked and dismayed when the Court refused to render for employers the same accommodation between Norris-LaGuardia and Section 301 which it had awarded labor in Lincoln Mills.
The majority centered its ruling primarily around the legislative history of Section 301, relying principally upon Congress' refusal
to expressly exempt Section 301 from the proscriptions of NorrisLaGuardia after having specifically considered a proposal to do so at
the time the statute was adopted. Because of this, the Court concluded
that Congress had not intended that strike injunctions were to be
46
employed as a means of making a "kingpin" out of arbitration. If
federal anti-strike injunctions were to be sanctioned under Section
47
301, then Congress, and not the Supreme Court, should so declare.
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan scored the majority for failing to recognize the need for accommodation between
the two statutes; 48 for deciding the case in a manner inconsistent with
the holdings in Chicago River and Lincoln Mills; 49 for basing its decision largely on the basis of legislative history which it considered to
be shrouded in ambiguity;50 and for dislocating generally that which
had been heretofore a consistent and increasingly harmonious body
of federal law governing suits under Section 301.51 Mr. Justice Brennan then stated the perplexing and troublesome new issues which the
Court would inevitdbly have to resolve because of this decision (and
to which he himself would ultimately respond in Boys Markets):
44 The term "kingpin" as applied to the standing of the arbitration process in
federal labor law was first coined by Mr. Justice Brennan in Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson,
370 U.S. 195, 226 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
45 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
46 Id. at 213.
47 Id. at 214-15.
48 Id. at 224.
49 Id. at 219-20.
50 Id. at 216-17.
51 Id. at 226-27.
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(1) Does the majority decision in Sinclair carry over to state
courts as a portion of federal labor law? If so, then employers
will be deprived "of a state remedy they enjoyed prior to its
52
[Section 301's] enactment."
(2) If not, then how is a uniform body of federal law to be maintained when the sole forums for antistrike injunctions are
state courts applying state law (since no federal policy exists
which is applicable to the states)? 53
(3) What about removal of the state suit to the federal court?
Will Section 4 of Norris-LaGuardia permit that action? And
if so, will this not also destroy a contract remedy available
54
before its enactment?
(4) Is not the future effectiveness of grievance arbitration as a
desirable technique to insure industrial tranquillity adversely affected by the majority decision? After all, said the
minority:
[S]ince unions cannot be enjoined by a federal court from striking
in open defiance of their undertakings to arbitrate, employers will
pause long before committing themselves to obligations enforce55
able against them but not against their unions.
FORUM-SHOPPING AND THE FEDERAL REMOVAL QUESTION AS A
RESULT OF

Sinclair

With the effect of Sinclair being to shift injunctive relief actions
to state courts, union attorneys began to employ the federal removal
statute56 as a means of countering these actions where state laws did
57
not prevent anti-strike injunctions from issuing against labor unions.
Obviously, if unions could get Section 301 cases removed to a federal
court, they could prevent any anti-strike injunctions from issuing.
Since actions in state courts which contained claims for damages as
well as for injunctive relief were more likely to be subject to removal
to federal courts, employers tended to restrict their remedial prayers
52 Id. at 226. Justice Brennan was obviously implying that Lucas Flour and Lincoln
Mills would say yes, if consistency was to be maintained. Such a holding, however, would
essentially overrule Dowd Box regarding Section 301 as being supplementary to state
jurisdiction.
53 Id. at 226. See also McCarroll v. Los Angeles Cty. Dist. Coun. of Carpenters, 49
Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957).
54 370 US. at 227.
55 Id.
56 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964).
57 See note 8 supra. Also, for a concise description of the mechanics of federal
removal, see Bartosic, supra note 8, at 991.
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to injunctions,5 because putting a quick end to a grievance-precipitated strike was the primary relief sought.
The theory behind this tactic was that Section 4 of NorrisLaGuardia not only denied federal courts the power to grant injunctive relief, but also denied the court original jurisdiction to even
consider the merits of the controversy where only injunctive relief
was sought. The logic was that a court which had no power to grant
the relief petitioned for could hardly be expected to have the power
to consider the merits of the dispute. Therefore, it followed that any
such cases statutorily removed to federal courts should be remanded
to state courts where proper and effective jurisdiction rested.59
This principle of remand to state courts was adopted by the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals in American Dredging Co. v. Local
25, IUOE.60 Other federal circuits, however, would not go along, most
notably the ninth circuit in Johnson v. England,6 1 and the sixth
circuit in Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, IAM.62 Since both
these cases disagreed openly with the holding in American Dredging,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue in its review
of Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, IAM. 63 Its holding was that
a union was entitled to remove from a state to a federal court an
employer's suit for an injunction against a strike claimed to be in
violation of a no-strike bargaining agreement. The claim arose under
a law of the United States (L.M.R.A. Section 301) and, hence, was
within the original jurisdiction of a federal district court. The Court,
however, dealt only with the issue of removability in Avco and expressly reserved any decision as to: (1) whether Section 4 of NorrisLaGuardia as interpreted by Sinclair was applicable to state courts
through Lucas Flour 4 (as was maintained by the sixth circuit 65); and
(2) whether Sinclair also required that a federal court dissolve any
state court injunction which might have been issued against the strike
(the district court had so acted in Avco, although, the Court noted,
for reasons not altogether clear6 6).
The Avco decision caused great concern among labor attorneys
58 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1964). See also Bartosic, supra note 8, at 988.
59 See generally Bartosic, supra note 8, at 988-89; Keene, The Supreme Court, Sec-

tion 301 and No-Strike Clauses: From Lincoln Mills to Avco and Beyond, 15 VILL. L. Rv.
32, 45 (1969).
60 338 F.2d 837 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 935 (1965).
61 356 F.2d 44 (9th Cir. 1966).
62 376 F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1967).
08 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
64 Id. at 560 n.2.
65 376 F.2d at 343.
60 390 U.S. at 561 n.4.
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when considered with Sinclair.6 1 As Justice Brennan later summed up
the situation in Boys Markets:
The principal practical effect of Avco and Sinclair taken together
is nothing less than to oust state courts of jurisdiction in § 301(a)
suits where injunctive relief is sought for breach of a no-strike
obligation. Union defendants can, as a matter of course, obtain
removal to a federal court, and there is obviously a compelling
incentive for them to do so in order to gain the advantage of
the strictures upon injunctive relief which Sinclair imposes on
federal courts. 68
While Avco settled the federal removal question as related to
Section 301 suits, it intensified the need for resolution of the more
basic issue as to whether or not Norris-LaGuardia's anti-injunction
provisions must apply to state-instituted Section 301 type actions, as
implied strongly by Lincoln Mills.69 Three times now the Court had
passed the question by.70 Furthermore, Avco did nothing to discourage
forum-shopping by the parties. This decision only made it much easier
for the striking union to have the complaint steered into the jurisdiction less likely to act effectively against its interests, a finding of
illegal conduct on the union's part notwithstanding. 71 Hence, the
emphasis remained on where the case was to be heard rather than on
the fact situation involved.
In the meantime, state courts generally regarded Sinclair and
Norris-LaGuardia as not applicable to state-instituted Section 301
type actions, even though the case might be removable to a federal
court. The leading state case which upheld their right to issue antistrike injunctions in Section 301 cases was McCarroll v. Los Angeles
7 2
in a much admired opinion
County District Council of Carpenters,
67 See, e.g., Bartosic, supra note 8; Keene, supra note 59; Wellington, The No-Strike
Clause and the Labor Injunction: Time for a Re-Examination, 30 U. Prrr. L. REV. 293
(1968); Kiernan, Availability of Injunctions Against Breaches of No-Strike Agreements in
Labor Contracts, 32 ALBANY L. REv. 303 (1968).
68 398 U.S. at 244-45.
69 The third circuit in American Dredging, 338 F.2d at 852, had also held that NorrisLaGuardia did not extend to the states; whereas, the sixth circuit in Avco, 376 F.2d at
342-43, had challenged the third circuit on this position as well as on the federal removal
question. The Supreme Court in Avco, as noted before at 390 U.S. 557, 560 n.2, expressly
avoided this issue, leaving the two cases still opposing each other. The dispute in
Johnson v. England, 356 F.2d 44 (9th Cir. 1966), did not involve the Norris-LaGuardia
Act.
70 Dowd Box, Sinclair, and Avco presented the issues but left them unresolved.
71 Federal courts could not grant any injunctive remedies against such conduct but
could only grant less effective remedies, such as an order to arbitrate the dispute, and
damages.
72 49 Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958).
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by Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court. 78 Similar stands
were taken by other state courts after Sinclair, the most notable being
Shaw Electric Co. v. IBEW Local No. 98,74 and C. D. Perry & Sons,
Inc. v. Robilotto.75 Only New Jersey seemed inclined to follow fed-

eral anti-injunction policies in interpreting its own anti-injunction
statute regarding breach-of-contract strikes, 76 and in extending Sin77
clair to the state level.

FLANKING MANEUVERS

IN

THE FEDERAL

COURTS TO AVOID THE

COMBINED EFFECTS OF Sinclair/Avco
While state courts still possessed the power to enjoin strikes
(provided their own laws permitted this), as well as to give other
remedies, employers were struggling to find some means of immediate
and effective relief in the federal courts without offending Sinclair in
order to halt breach-of-contract strikes. This tendency was virtually
guaranteed by the Avco decision, since that holding insured that a
much greater number of Section 301 cases brought by employers
would end up in federal court through the removal statute. One
such method which appeared to show considerable promise was judicial enforcement of an arbitration award which upheld and enforced a no-strike clause upon an offending union. 78 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, which had also handed down the American
Dredging decision, had first encountered this issue in Philadelphia

Marine Trade Ass'n v. ILA, Local 1291, 79 (which predated the Avco
ruling by the Supreme Court) and had affirmed the enforcement of
such an award by a federal district court. This case was reversed by
the Supreme Court, and like Avco, it turned on a procedural matter
involving the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,8 ° rather than on the
basic labor law issue presented.
73 For a detailed treatment of the McCarroll case, see Aaron, supra note 6, at 1030-34;
Bartosic, supra note 8, at 1003-06; Keene, supra note 59, at 50-52.
74 418 Pa. 1, 208 A.2d 769 (1965).
75 39 Misc. 2d 147, 240 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Sup. Ct. 1963), aff'd, 23 App. Div. 2d 949, 260
N.Y.S.2d 158 (1965).

76 Commercial Can Corp. v. Local 810, Teamsters, 61 N.J. Super. 369, 160 A.2d 855
(App. Div. 1960).
77 Independent Oil Workers v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 85 N.J. Super. 453, 205 A.2d
78 (Ch. 1964).
78 For an enthusiastic endorsement of this possibility, see Keene, supra note 59, at
55-61. Bartosic, supra note 8, also advocated this approach at 1011-17.
79 365 F.2d 295 (3d Cir. 1966).
80 389 U.S. 64 (1967). The specific Federal Rule involved was Rule 65(d).
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The next significant case along this line was New Orleans Steamship Ass'n v. ILA, Local No. 1418.81 This decision also affirmed the
specific enforcement of an arbitration award ordering an end to a
union's work stoppages which violated a no-strike clause, on the
theory that neither Sinclair nor Section 4 of Norris-LaGuardia barred
federal courts from effecting such relief. Such an approach was also
followed by the Federal District Court for the Northern District of
California in Pacific Maritime Ass'n v.

ILWU. 8 2

However, the Fed-

eral District Court for the Southern District of New York held that
even in this situation, the Sinclair rule prevented a federal court
from enjoining strike activity through enforcement of an arbitration
award.8 3 By the Supreme Court's refusal to deal with this issue in
Philadelphia Marine, followed by its refusal to grant certiorari to
New Orleans Steamship Ass'n, optimism arose that the Supreme Court
might in due course be willing to affirm this type of judicial activity
84
as an indirect way of modifying Sinclair.
This form of remedy, however, even if adopted, would not have
represented ,a wholly adequate substitute for a direct court injunction
because the ad hoc arbitration process in most labor contracts is not
swift enough to react to sudden strike actions. Without the existence
of special contract provisions, the normal arbitration procedure involves arbitrator selection, presentation of the dispute, a decision,
and a refusal by the losing party to abide by the decision before
any specific performance complaint can be brought before the courta period of time which could involve several weeks.
Another issue working its way up toward the Supreme Court
was whether or not a federal court must, under Sinclair, dissolve any
state anti-strike injunction which had been issued prior to removal
to federal court under the removal statute. This point was also expressly avoided in Avco; however, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
81 389 F.2d 369 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 828 (1968).
82 304 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
88 Marine Transport Lines, Inc. v. Curran, 65 L.R.R.M. 2095, 55 CCH Lab. Cas.
§ 11,748 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
:84 A more novel approach was taken by the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Tanker Service Comm., Inc. v. International Org.,
AFL-CIO, 269 F. Supp. 551 (E.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd, 394 F.2d 160 (3d Cir. 1968, where
the judge gave substantial compensatory damages against a striking union on a conditional basis: such an award would become effective if the union failed to return to work
within 48 hours. The strategy forced the union to end the strike. It is suggested, however,
that this tactic would have limited application. See Keene, supra note 59, at 63-65.
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felt obliged to affirm dissolution of the injunction in General Electric Co. v. Local 191, 1UE8 5 on the ground that,
once this case was removed, a failure to dissolve the state court
injunction would have been tantamount to issuance of that same
injunction by the federal district court, which .

.

. would be pro-

scribed by the Norris-LaGuardia Act under the Sinclair decision.80

Thus, the state of affairs which greeted the Supreme Court in
1970 was as follows:
(1) Because of Sinclair, federal courts were prevented by NorrisLaGuardia from employing one of their most effective means
of insuring that arbitration, rather than industrial strife, was
the primary method used to resolve grievance-type labor disputes. As a result, many Section 301 suits had been driven
into state courts where injunctive relief was determined according to diverse local principles of contract and labor law.
Consequently, after having espoused the virtues and necessities for uniform application of labor laws, 87 the Supreme
Court had contributed materially to bringing about the contrary result.
(2) As a result of the Sinclair-Avco combination, Section 301
cases had, practically speaking, been largely extracted from
state court jurisdiction despite the Court's express holding
that Section 301 was designed to supplement, not replace,
state court activities in this area of labor law. 8 The effect of
this combination was to seriously exacerbate the imbalance
of remedies available to employers as opposed to unions in
Section 301 actions.
(3) Federal courts had begun to respond to attempts to outflank
the Sinclair decision through such legal devices as judicial
enforcement of arbitration awards relating to no-strike
clauses, "conditioned" compensatory damages, etc., in a persistent effort to keep upright the "kingpin" of federal labor
policy.
(4) State courts were generally standing fast in their belief that
Section 4 of Norris-LaGuardia as interpreted by Sinclair did
85 413 F.2d 964 (5th Cir. 1969).
86 Id. at 966.

87 Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
88 Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
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not apply to them. Opinion in the lower federal courts was
divided on the issue, and up to 1970 the Supreme Court had
refused to rule on it. In addition, controversy was beginning
to build over the status of a state's anti-strike injunction
once the case had been removed to a federal court.
It was in this atmosphere that the Boys Markets case arrived for consideration by the Supreme Court.8 9
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerk's Union, Local 77090
The dispute which prompted Boys Markets, Inc. to bring this
action arose when its frozen foods supervisor, and certain persons
working for him, rearranged merchandise in the frozen foods section
of one of petitioner's food markets. Inasmuch as the individuals involved did not belong to the authorized union representing employees
in the firm, the union representative demanded that the cases be
emptied of all merchandise and restocked by bargaining unit employees. When the employer refused, the union called a work stoppage
and commenced picketing the premises. This action was taken despite
the existence of a collective bargaining agreement which contained
an arbitration clause for the resolution of such disputes, and in addition, a no-strike clause. Petitioner, after failing in its attempts to
invoke said articles, filed a complaint in California Superior Court
and obtained a temporary injunction forbidding continuation of the
strike. It also obtained an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not be granted. Thereupon, the union removed the
case to the United States District Court for the Central District of
California and there moved to have the restraining order quashed.
The district court, however, concluded that the dispute was subject
to arbitration and that the strike violated the contract. Hence, it ordered the parties to arbitrate the matter, and enjoined the strike. 91
This ruling, of course, led to an appeal by the union, and a reversal by the court of appeals. 92 In a brief opinion, the circuit court
held that the employer's reliance upon ILA, Local 1291 v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n 98 and New Orleans Steamship Ass'n v.
ILA Local No. 141894 was misplaced since these cases involved judicial
89 Cert. granted, 396 U.S. 1000 (1970).
90 398 U.S. 235 (1970).

59 CCH
F.2d
93 389 U.S.
94 389 F.2d
91

92 416

Lab. Cas. § 13,366 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
368 (9th Cir. 1969).
64 (1967).
369 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 828 (1968).
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enforcement of arbitration awards. In this case, however, no such
award had been made, and, therefore, the principles of Sinclair were
controlling. 9
It does not appear surprising that the Supreme Court agreed to
hear the Boys Markets case. Several justices had indicated in Avco 9 e
and Philadelphia Marine"7 a need to reconsider the Sinclair case.
Secondly, the Avco decision clearly had created an ambiguous situation which threatened to seriously limit arbitration as a primary
method of resolving grievance disputes. Finally, the legal community
was becoming increasingly vocal about modifying or refining the
Sinclair decision in some way. Commentators varied, however, as to
what approach should be taken. Some advocated reversal, or at least
strong modification, of Sinclair.98 Others favored instead an extension
of the Sinclair rule to state courts as the way to regain uniformity of
the law. 99 A third approach suggested was that of judicial enforcement of arbitration awards banning strikes which violated no-strike
clauses.' 00 Finally, there were those who agreed with Mr. Justice Black
in his dissenting opinion in Boys Markets'0 ' that Congress was the
02
only entity empowered to alter the effects of Sinclair.'
With many legal scholars proposing subtle forms of circumvention or dilution of Sinclair, and with the Court's previous reluctance
in extending or modifying Sinclair to any extent, it is perhaps some-*
what surprising to find that the Court faced the matter directly and
admitted that Sinclair was a mistake which must be reversed. 10 3 However, when one really understands the confusion and the inequities
created in the aftermath of Sinclair and Avco, and the substantial
threat posed to the future of arbitration as a viable instrument of
federal labor policy, reversal of Sinclair was really the only effective
alternative. After brushing aside the need to respect stare decisis as a
consideration in the present case, 10 4 and rejecting the theory that
"congressional silence should be interpreted as acceptance of the
95 416 F.2d at 370.
96 390 U.S. at 562 (Stewart, J., concurring).
97 389 U.S. at 77 (Douglas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).

Wellington, supra note 67 at 306-08; Kiernan, supra note 67, at 315-16.
99 Aaron, supra note 6, at 1051-52; Bartosic, supra note 8, at 1001-11.
100 Bartosic, supra note 8; Keene, supra note 59, at 55-61.
101 398 U.S. at 256.
102 Wellington and Albert, Statutory Interpretation and the Political Process: A
Comment on Sinclair v. Atkinson, 72 YALE L.J. 1547, 1559-66 (1963); Bartosic, supra
note 8, at 996-1001.
103 398 U.S. at 238.
104 Id. at 240-41.
98
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[Sinclair] decision,"' 05 the Court proceeded to address itself to the
issues at hand. First, it reaffirmed the doctrine established in Dowd
Box that Congress had not intended that state court jurisdiction be
displaced by Section 301. However, because Sinclair, coupled with
Avco, had brought this result about in cases where injunctive remedies were sought, a situation was created which was clearly not
intended by Congress and which was contrary to its expressed desires. 10 The Court also recognized the lack of uniformity which had
developed contrary to the doctrine expressed in Lucas Flour. The
Court stated:
The injunction ...is so important a remedial device, particularly
in the arbitration context, that its availability or nonavailability
in various courts will not only produce rampant forum shopping
and maneuvering from one court to another but will also greatly
uniformity in the enforcement of arbitrafrustrate any relative
07
tion agreements.
The Court next turned to the question of extending Sinclair to
the state courts as a solution to this problem. The Court did not make
this extension but instead adopted the rationale expressed in Justice
Traynor's opinion in McCarrollv. Los Angeles County District Council of Carpenters,0 8 which stated that Congress had not attempted
either through Norris-LaGuardia or through Section 301 to limit a
state court's anti-strike injunctive powers when enforcing a collective
bargaining agreement. 10 9 An additional reason, the Court said, for not
extending Sinclair to the states was the fear of "devastating implications for the enforceability of arbitration agreements and their
accompanying no-strike obligations if equitable remedies were not
available." 110 This latter point, however, seems a more appropriate
reason to justify accommodating Section 301 with Norris-LaGuardia
than it does for refusing to extend Sinclair and, hence, Norris-LaGuardia to the states. In view of the Court's basic decision, however,
the question of Norris-LaGuardia's applicability to the states, at
least over the issue of enforcement of collective bargaining agreements,
appears now to have become a moot issue.
The Court's real purpose in Boys Markets was to bring about the
long overdue accommodation between Section 301 and Norris-LaId. at 241.
Id. at 245.
Id. at 246.
49 Cal. 2d 45, 61, 315 P.2d 322, 332 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958).
109 398 U.S. at 247.
110 Id.
105
106
107
108
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Guardia. Citing the Chicago River case as stating the proper principles
applicable to an accommodation with Norris-LaGuardia,"' the Court
went on to say:
We conclude, therefore, that the unavailability of equitable relief
in the arbitration context presents a serious impediment to the
congressional policy favoring the voluntary establishment of a
mechanism for the peaceful resolution of labor disputes, that the
core purpose of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is not sacrificed by the
limited use of equitable remedies to further this important policy,
and consequently that the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not bar the
granting
of injunctive relief in the circumstances of the instant
112
case.
In a sharp dissent, Mr. Justice Black observed that the only change
which had occurred since Sinclair was the membership of the Court
and the personal views of Mr. Justice Stewart toward the primary
issue. 113 The rest of his opinion, however, submerged into familiar
(and somewhat tiresome) rhetoric which scored the majority for not
observing the doctrine of stare decisis; for not "letting Congress do
it"; and for exercising legislative rather than judicial powers." 4 Mr.
Justice White also dissented without further opinion on the strength
of the majority opinion in Sinclair.
IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE IMPACT OF

Boys Markets-

BROAD OR LIMITED?

Mr. Justice Brennan declared that the ruling in Boys Markets
was to be construed as "a narrow one" which was not intended to
undermine Norris-LaGuardia:
We deal only with the situation in which a collective-bargaining
contract contains a mandatory grievance adjustment or arbitration
procedure. Nor does it follow from what we have said that injunctive relief is appropriate as a matter of course in every case
of a strike over an arbitrable grievance. 115
It is interesting to note that Justice Brennan was careful not to make
his holding so narrow as to include only labor contracts with express
no-strike clauses. By so doing, he indirectly reaffirmed another important holding in the Lucas Flour case, that an agreement to arbi111 Id.

at 252.
112 Id. at 253.
I's Id. at 256.
114 Id. at 257-59

115 Id. at 253-54.
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trate implies an agreement not to strike even though no express language to that effect exists in the collective bargaining agreement." 6
Hence, he strongly implied that striking unions could not take
refuge from Boys Markets by bargaining no-strike clauses out of future labor contracts.
What perhaps might be of more concern would be the risk that
certain federal district courts might become overly zealous in their
use of the injunction to prevent grievance-oriented strikes without due
regard for the merits or the arbitrability of the dispute. As Lucas
Flour stated in qualifying its holding:
What has been said is not to suggest that a no-strike agreement is to be implied beyond the area which it has been agreed will
be exclusively covered by compulsory terminal arbitration. Nor
is it to suggest that there may not arise problems in specific cases
as to whether compulsory and binding arbitration has been agreed17
upon, and if so, as to what disputes have been made arbitrable.
It seems clear that Justice Brennan had this in mind when he
reiterated much the same guidelines in Boys Markets as in his Sinclair dissent; 118 principles which obviously were designed to discourage any sort of return to the inglorious days when federal courts abused
the injunctive process to prevent union organizing and collective bargaining. 1 9 Thus, a federal district court is not empowered to grant
injunctive relief against concerted activity unless the following conditions are met:
(1) The facts of the case must be such that an injunctive order
would be appropriate despite the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
(2) The strike must involve a grievance which both parties are
contractually bound to arbitrate. Furthermore, such provisions must be specifically enforceable against either party.
(3) The employer must be willing to arbitrate the dispute, i.e.,
any anti-strike injunction issued will be effective only if the
employer agrees to arbitrate the grievance dispute.
(4) The injunction must be warranted under ordinary equitable
principles, i.e., the nature of the breach, probabilities of irreparable damages, inadequacy of other forms of relief, etc. 20
116 369 U.S. at 104-06.
117 Id. at 106.

118 370 U.S. at 228.
119 See, F. FRANKFURTER
120

398 U.S. at 254.

& N.

GREENE, THE

LABOR INJUNCTION (1930).
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At the same time, Boys Markets does recognize that the labor injunction is an extremely important judicial remedy which, if properly
controlled, can render effective service to the cause of peaceful industrial relations. It also admits that a too restrictive policy against its
use can be as unsatisfactory as an unrestricted one.
Although at this time it is too early to discern a clearly emerging
pattern, it is submitted that Boys Markets will have a powerful impact
upon the future viability of arbitration in labor relations and in the
stability of collective bargaining agreements. The first indication of
this trend has already appeared when the Court remanded the General Electric Co. v. Local 191, IUE case for reconsideration in the
light of the Boys Markets decision.

21

As was previously discussed, it

was this case which had held that the Sinclair rule required that a
federal court must dissolve a state court anti-strike injunction, even
though the strike action violated a union contract and also a state
law. Consequently, a federal court may now, at its discretion, continue or abolish a state court injunction (which was also the basic
issue facing the federal district court in the Boys Markets case). Boys
Markets has also been cited recently as authority in discussing the
interpretation of congressional silence, 122 and as applicable in prin2
ciple to an N.L.R.A. Section 10 (k) proceeding.' 3
Also, two federal district courts have recently applied Boys Markets to fact situations similar to those in that case. In Stroehmann
Bros. Co. v. Local 427, Confectionary Workers,'124 the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania held that an
employer was not entitled to a temporary injunction against a union
strike which allegedly breached a no-strike agreement. The court
determined that the labor agreement was not specifically enforceable
against both parties, and that neither employer nor union were contractually bound to arbitrate grievance disputes such as that which
caused the strike. 125 Thus, since the question of arbitrability had not
been affirmatively resolved as required by Boys Markets, no anti-strike
injunction could issue.' 26 In Holland Construction Co. v. IUOE Local
No. 101,127 the United States District Court for the District of Kansas
121 74 L.R.R.M. 2420 (1970).

Salerno v. American League, 74 L.R.R.M. 2929 (2d Cir. 1970).
123 Plasterer's Local 79 v, NLRB, 74 L.R.R.M. 2575 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
124 74 L.R.R.M. 2957 (M.D. Pa. 1970).
125 Id. at 2959-60.
126 Id. at 2960.
127 74 L.R.R.M. 3087 (D. Kan. 1970).
122

148
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held that an anti-strike injunction was warranted and proper within
the Boys Markets guidelines, since all questions of arbitrability and
equity had been resolved in favor of the employer.
These two cases demonstrate that the Boys Markets decision will
undoubtedly be applied in varying degrees to increasingly varied fact
situations in the months to come. Continued lively discussions and
legal activities regarding this area of labor law are not likely to wither
away, even though the Sinclair "frog" has finally been swallowed by
the Supreme Court.
Paul H. Martin

